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Mathis v. U.S. and the Future of the 
Categorical Approach 
Evan Tsen Lee† 
For federal public defenders and immigration clinicians, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 23rd decision in Mathis v. Unit-
ed States1 was cause for celebration. As they had hoped, the 
Court strongly reaffirmed its 2013 decision in Descamps v. 
United States,2 which had protected the “categorical approach” 
to determining which prior convictions qualify for federal sen-
tencing enhancements or negative immigration treatment. In 
the vast majority of cases, the categorical approach is favorable 
to criminal defendants and immigration petitioners because it 
prevents the government from getting incriminating facts into 
evidence.3 Emphatic as the Mathis majority’s support for the 
categorical approach may be, however, the concurring and dis-
senting opinions call the approach’s future into serious ques-
tion.4 
As I wrote in my SCOTUSblog opinion analysis, it was 
more than a little surprising that Justices Stephen Breyer and 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented in Mathis after having joined 
the Descamps majority.5 “The majority’s approach, I fear, is not 
practical,” Breyer wrote, joined by Ginsburg.6 Although he 
made a tepid attempt to distinguish Mathis from Descamps, 
 
†  Acting Provost & Academic Dean and Professor of Law, UC Hastings 
College of the Law. Copright © 2016 by Evan Tsen Lee. 
 1. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
 2. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Moncrieffe, 167 F.Supp.3d 383, 406 
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (stating that, because of a particular statute’s structure, “the 
categorical approach must result in a favorable decision for defendant”). 
 4. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2258–59 
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2259–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 5. Evan Lee, Opinion Analysis: Victory for the “Categorical Approach” in 
Immigration and Federal Criminal Sentencing—But for How Long?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 10:12 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/ 
opinion-analysis-victory-for-the-categorical-approach-in-immigration-and 
-federal-criminal-sentencing-but-for-how-long. 
 6. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2263 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Breyer may have had second thoughts about the workability of 
lower federal courts having to determine when they must use 
the unadorned categorical approach, as opposed to when they 
may preface the categorical approach with what has come to be 
known as the “modified categorical approach” (MCA).7 The sim-
ple use of the categorical approach tends to be individual-
friendly, whereas the effectively pre-emptive MCA tends to be 
government friendly. 
Justice Samuel Alito has always opposed the categorical 
approach, dissenting alone in Descamps,8 so it was no surprise 
that he dissented in Mathis. If Breyer’s and Ginsburg’s dissent 
in Mathis is taken to mean that they no longer support the cat-
egorical approach (not a given), that would make three votes to 
do away with it. The vote for the petitioner in Mathis was five 
to three, with the swing vote cast by Justice Anthony Kennedy.9 
If he had voted with the dissenters, the decision below would 
have been affirmed by an equally divided Court. Kennedy’s ex-
planation for why he voted with the majority should greatly 
alarm supporters of the categorical approach. 
According to Kennedy, the precedents clearly supported 
the decision in Mathis.10 But he urged Congress to overrule 
those precedents, and Mathis itself. “[T]oday’s decision is a 
stark illustration of the arbitrary and inequitable results pro-
duced by applying an elements based approach to this sentenc-
ing scheme,” he wrote.11 “[C]ontinued congressional inaction in 
the face of a system that each year proves more unworkable 
should require this Court to revisit its precedent in an appro-
priate case,” he concluded.12 Although he stopped short of say-
ing that he would overrule the categorical approach entirely, 
rather than simply overrule the Mathis-Descamps method of 
 
 7. Id.; see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281 (“We have previously ap-
proved . . . the ‘modified categorical approach’—when a prior conviction is for 
violating a so-called ‘divisible statute.’ That kind of statute sets out one or 
more elements of the offense in the alternative . . . .”); Shepard v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (holding that when employing the “modified cat-
egorical approach,” a court is permitted to consult “the statutory definition, 
charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and 
any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assent-
ed”). 
 8. Descamps, 135 S. Ct. at 2295–2303 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 9. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2243. 
 10. Id. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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determining when the MCA may be used, it is hard to see as a 
practical matter how the Court could do one without doing the 
other.13 
Mathis thus raises two questions: First, how likely is the 
Court to scrap the categorical approach? Second, assuming that 
the Court does not scrap the categorical approach, should the 
Court instead scrap the modified categorical approach? 
I.  PREDICTION MODE: IS THE CATEGORICAL 
APPROACH IN TROUBLE?   
The categorical approach will be in trouble if either of two 
scenarios occurs.14 One scenario occurs if enough Justices de-
cide (A) that the administrative difficulties are irremediable, 
and (B) if they attribute those difficulties to the categorical ap-
proach rather than to the MCA. The second scenario occurs if 
enough Justices decide that the categorical approach results in 
an unjustifiable windfall for federal criminal defendants and 
immigrants. 
These two predictive scenarios correspond to the two lead-
ing normative arguments for abolishing the categorical ap-
proach, one pragmatic and the other ideological. The pragmatic 
argument against the categorical approach is that it is too hard 
to apply—that lower federal court judges are completely con-
fused.15 Justice Kennedy based his concurrence at least in part 
on the existence of confusion, and Justices Breyer and Gins-
burg cited lack of practicality in their dissent. The ideological 
 
 13. This is why I also believe that Breyer’s and Ginsburg’s dissent in 
Mathis possibly means they no longer generally support the categorical ap-
proach. Both Justices have authored majority opinions in the past cutting into 
the categorical approach. See generally Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) 
(Breyer, J.) (applying a circumstance-specific approach rather than a categori-
cal approach to determine which prior convictions qualify as fraud involving at 
least $10,000); United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (Ginsburg, J.) (ap-
plying a circumstance-specific approach rather than a categorical approach to 
determine which prior convictions qualify as involving domestic violence). 
 14. In the lead-up to Descamps, immigration clinicians took their case in 
favor of the categorical approach to the law reviews. See, e.g., Alina Das, Im-
migration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analy-
sis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011); Jennifer L. Koh, Whole 
Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the 
Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 257 (2011); Rebecca 
A. Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical Analy-
sis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (2008). 
 15. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 14, at 278 (“[I]n the recidivist sentencing 
and immigration contexts . . . the doctrine suffers from incoherence and confu-
sion . . . as the courts struggle to apply the categorical approach.”). 
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argument against the categorical approach is that it gives crim-
inal defendants and immigrants an undeserved reprieve from 
the rightful consequences of their prior convictions.16 Justice 
Alito clearly believes this, and perhaps Justice Kennedy does 
too. 
Let us consider the first predictive scenario, in which a suf-
ficient number of Justices decides that this area of the law has 
become unworkable. The Justices in Mathis disagreed about 
whether it is unworkable, and I predict that this disagreement 
will persist for some time. The early decisions following Mathis 
suggest that lower courts are “getting it,” but the decisions are 
too few to draw any meaningful conclusions.17 
It is undoubtedly true that many, perhaps most, federal 
judges are confused about this area. (I base this on a combina-
tion of formal opinions and informal conversations with judges.) 
But it is absolutely critical to see that judges are not confused 
about how the categorical approach works. They understand 
that, when most federal sentencing and immigration standards 
speak of a “conviction,” those standards do not refer to the facts 
that underlie the conviction, but rather to the essential ele-
ments of the statute of conviction. Judges generally know that 
the categorical approach does not permit them to look at the 
facts.18 They also generally understand that the application of 
the categorical approach to a given conviction under a given 
federal statutory standard (sentencing or immigration) is sup-
posed to produce a binary result: either the conviction qualifies 
under the relevant standard or it does not. There is no in-
between. 
What confuses lower federal court judges is under what 
circumstances the modified categorical approach applies. Look-
 
 16. Cf. Caleb E. Mason & Scott M. Lesowitz, A Rational Post-Booker Pro-
posal for Reform of Federal Sentencing Enhancements for Prior Convictions, 31 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 339, 369 (2011) (stating that the fortuity of the state of con-
viction has far too great of an impact on whether or not that individual is sub-
jected to sentencing enhancements). 
 17. See, e.g., Singh v. Att’y Gen., No. 15-2274, 2016 WL 5845692 (3d Cir. 
Oct. 6, 2016); Gomez-Perez v. Lynch, 829 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 18. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (“This question re-
quires us to address a more general issue—whether the sentencing court in 
applying § 924(e) must look only to the statutory definitions of the prior of-
fenses, or whether the court may consider other evidence concerning the de-
fendant’s prior crimes. The Courts of Appeals uniformly have held that 
§ 924(e) mandates a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory 
definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying 
those convictions.”). 
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ing at the facts is a strong occupational proclivity for judges; it’s 
what they do. Thus there is a powerful, non-ideological impulse 
driving their desire to apply the MCA. Before Descamps, many 
lower federal court judges could not have explained the purpose 
of the MCA.19 They only knew that it permitted them to look at 
the facts, which in most cases led to a conclusion that the indi-
vidual had engaged in conduct that placed them within the rel-
evant sentencing or immigration standard. Again, it cannot be 
sufficiently emphasized that this feels like the essence of “judg-
ing”—the application of a legal standard to specific facts, pro-
ducing a conclusion. But this judicially intuitive view of the 
MCA is flatly incorrect. Descamps made clear what the Court 
first stated in the path-marking 1990 case of Taylor v. United 
States:20 the MCA is used only for the limited purpose of deter-
mining under which portion of a statute the prior conviction 
was obtained.21 Unless a court can determine which part of a 
statute produced a given conviction, it cannot conclusively de-
termine whether the conviction qualifies as, to give a few ex-
amples, a “violent felony” (federal sentencing)22 or an “aggra-
vated felony”23 or “crime involving moral turpitude” 
(immigration).24 The MCA is not there to enable the judge to 
use the facts to settle the ultimate legal question, which is 
whether the conviction qualifies under the relevant standard. 
 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“The categorical and modified categorical frameworks, first out-
lined by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States, establish the rules by 
which the government may use prior state convictions to enhance certain fed-
eral sentences and to remove certain aliens. In the twenty years since Taylor, 
we have struggled to understand the contours of the Supreme Court’s frame-
work.” (citation omitted)), abrogated by Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2276 (2013). 
 20. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600. 
 21. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281. 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Section 924(e)(2)(B) was found to be unconsti-
tutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 16. Section 16(b) has been held unconstitutional by several 
courts of appeal and the Supreme Court will hear a case on its constitutionali-
ty in the October 2016 term. See Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 
2015), cert. granted, No. 15-1498, 2016 WL 3232911 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2016); see 
also Golicov v. Lynch, No. 16-9530, 2016 WL 4988012 (10th Cir. Sept. 19, 
2016); Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Vivas-
Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 24. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Crimes involving moral turpitude have 
been subjected to wide-ranging criticism as well. See, e.g., Arias v. Lynch, No. 
14-2839, 2016 WL 4468076, at *6 (Posner, J., concurring) (“It is preposterous 
that that stale, antiquated, and, worse, meaningless phrase should continue to 
be a part of American law.”). 
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That always remains a purely legal question, because it is cate-
gorical. 
Although the MCA’s limited purpose should have been 
clear long ago,25 the Court used Descamps to reiterate the 
point.26 Descamps therefore constituted a major step forward in 
the Court’s MCA jurisprudence. But Descamps effectively shift-
ed the locus of uncertainty from the purpose of the MCA to its 
proper occasion. Descamps said that courts must use the MCA 
when the underlying statute is “divisible,” and that they may 
not use it when the statute is “indivisible.”27 But courts have 
struggled with figuring which statutes were divisible.28 In my 
view, there were multiple causes for this confusion. First, it 
was unclear from Supreme Court opinions whether the litmus 
test for divisibility was essential elements or means of commis-
sion. The Court has now resolved that confusion in favor of el-
ements.29 Second, however, it was also unclear how to deter-
mine whether a given statutory term constitutes an element or 
a means, and that confusion may well continue to a significant 
degree after Mathis. Is “elementness,” to coin an ugly term, a 
function of the requirement of jury unanimity? Of the require-
ment of specificity in pleading? Of the structure of the statutory 
text (e.g., separate subsections versus enumeration within a 
single sentence versus cross-referencing to another statute)? 
Third, in the immigration area, at least, the proper applicabil-
ity of the MCA was grossly distorted by the Attorney General’s 
decision in a case called In re Silva-Trevino.30 The decision has 
 
 25. In no small part because of cases like Aguila-Montes and In re Silva-
Trevino. See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 
2011), abrogated by Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013); In re 
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 
550 (Att’y Gen. 2015). 
 26. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281 (“[T]he modified categorical approach 
permits sentencing courts to consult a limited class of documents, such as in-
dictments and jury instructions, to determine which alternative formed the 
basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.”). 
 27. Id. at 2281–82. 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(stating that the Court found that the “means/elements distinction . . . was ex-
plicitly rejected in Descamps” but that this was a matter of contention between 
the circuit courts), overruled by Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 
(2016). 
 29. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. 
 30. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008), vacated, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 
(Att’y Gen. 2015). 
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since been abrogated in light of Descamps, but the damage will 
take long to repair. 
So, is the categorical approach in trouble? If so, it will not 
be because of problems in administering the categorical ap-
proach itself. As I have pointed out, the real problem is admin-
istering the MCA, not the categorical approach.31 But some Jus-
tices may believe that the categorical approach cannot stand 
without the availability of the MCA. They may well ask how a 
court can apply the categorical approach if it cannot first de-
termine which portion of the statute of conviction is involved. 
Yet there is a simple response to this: if the government cannot 
carry its burden of showing that the conviction satisfies the rel-
evant sentencing or immigration standard, then the conviction 
simply does not qualify. Imagine the following rule: in any case 
where it is ambiguous which portion of a statute generated the 
conviction in question, the conviction simply does not qualify. 
In other words, if the conviction’s statutory etiology is unclear 
from the face of the pleadings, the conviction does not apply. 
That is a perfectly coherent rule. That rule would be easy to 
apply. 
Of course, such a rule would lead to more convictions being 
disqualified than at present, which brings us back to the ideo-
logical argument against the categorical approach. Determin-
ing whether convictions qualify on a categorical, rather than 
factual, basis leads to a “windfall” for federal criminal defend-
ants and immigrants.32 In a case where a look at the facts clear-
ly indicates that the defendant’s underlying conduct “fits” the 
relevant standard, why should the defendant or immigrant es-
cape his just deserts merely because some hypothetical defend-
ant could be convicted under that statute for conduct that 
would not fit the standard? The categorical approach judges a 
person not on what he did, but on what some imaginary person 
might do. 
 
 31. It is true that the “least culpable conduct” form of the categorical ap-
proach, which is controlling in most sentencing and immigration standards, 
has an inherently arbitrary stopping point to it. Under this mode of analysis, 
judges must imagine the least culpable conduct that nonetheless violates the 
statute of conviction, in order to determine whether it meets the relevant sen-
tencing or immigration standard. But the arbitrariness of the least culpable 
conduct test is not what prompted the Court to grant certiorari in Descamps 
and Mathis; it was uncertainty about when courts may use the MCA that 
drove those decisions. 
 32. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
  
270 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [101:263 
 
To understand the “windfall” argument more concretely, 
let’s look at Mathis itself. Mathis faced a federal mandatory 
minimum sentence based on prior convictions in Iowa for “bur-
glary.”33 The federal generic standard for “burglary” is an un-
privileged entry into a fixed structure with the intent to commit 
a felony therein.34 To qualify as burglary under federal sentenc-
ing law, the entry may not be into anything that moves, such as 
a car, boat, or plane.35 The problem in Mathis’s situation was 
that the Iowa burglary statute includes cars, boats, and 
planes.36 A person can be convicted of burglary in Iowa for 
breaking into a car with the intent to commit a felony therein. 
So, did Mathis’s “burglary” convictions qualify? 
“How could they not qualify?” asked the federal prosecutor. 
The record clearly indicated that Mathis had broken into build-
ings, not cars or boats.37 The lower courts agreed, saying that 
the MCA applied to the Iowa burglary statute whether “vehi-
cles” was an essential element or merely a means of commis-
sion.38 It was this lower court holding that the Supreme Court 
reversed in Mathis, reiterating the point made in its prece-
dents, that the MCA only applies where the statutory term in 
issue is an element, and not if it is merely a means of commis-
sion.39 Mathis, therefore, escaped a mandatory minimum sen-
tence on the technicality that Iowa law treats the places of bur-
glaries as means rather than elements, which surely has 
nothing to do with his dangerousness, his moral desert, or any-
thing else connected to the facts of his situation. It thus feels 
like a windfall. This was the main point of Justice Alito’s dis-
sent and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Mathis. 
The remainder of this Essay will be devoted to showing 
why the windfall argument is mistaken. To (sort of) keep my 
promise of a prediction, though, I think the categorical ap-
proach is one of the many doctrines whose fate turns on the 
Justice appointed by President-elect Trump. I count Alito as a 
sure vote to overrule the categorical approach based on the 
windfall rationale. His dissenting opinions in Mathis and 
 
 33. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 2015), over-
ruled by Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
 34. Id. at 1072. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 1074. 
 37. Id. at 1073. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). 
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Descamps leave little doubt about that. I view Kennedy as the 
next most likely to vote for overruling the categorical approach. 
I would rate Breyer and Ginsburg as slightly more likely than 
not to overrule the categorical approach, but their views may be 
complicated by the possibility of other ways of applying the 
MCA. Thomas, Kagan, and Sotomayor would seem to be sure 
votes to retain the categorical approach—Thomas on Sixth 
Amendment grounds,40 Kagan and Sotomayor based on stare 
decisis. (Kagan and Sotomayor may also be sympathetic to the 
categorical approach because it abates some of the harshness of 
the INA.) Roberts is a shaky vote to retain the categorical ap-
proach; if I had to guess, I think he would be swayed by stare 
decisis. That would leave it up to Justice Scalia’s replacement,41 
so I shall go no further with my prediction. 
II.  NORMATIVE MODE: ABOLISH THE MCA   
Even if Mathis does not clear up the confusion over when 
the modified categorical approach may be applied, the correct 
remedy is not to abolish the categorical approach. The correct 
remedy is to abolish the modified categorical approach. The lat-
ter exists because a court cannot apply the categorical approach 
to a prior conviction unless it can ascertain what the conviction 
was for. In Mathis, the conviction was for burglary in Iowa, 
which could be an intrusion into a house, car, boat, or plane to 
commit a crime.42 Yet under the ACCA, “burglary” only includes 
intrusion into a fixed structure. Thus, the lower federal courts 
used the modified categorical approach to “peek” at the facts,43 
 
 40. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563–73 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 41. Justice Scalia was an adamant defender of the categorical approach. 
See Andrea Sáenz, Justice Scalia’s Crimmigration Legacy, CRIMMIGRATION 
(Feb. 16, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://crimmigration.com/2016/02/16/justice-scalias 
-crimmigration-legacy (“Scalia was an extremely reliable vote for the ‘categori-
cal approach’ . . . .”). 
 42. Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1073. 
 43. See Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 474 (9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (“Descamps permits us to peek at the Shepard documents in order 
to determine which approach to use. If those documents show that a statutory 
term was an element of the offense, we may employ the modified categorical 
approach and use the documents to determine whether a defendant committed 
a state crime falling within the ambit of the relevant federal statute. But if the 
Shepard documents instead show that the statutory alternative was simply a 
means of committing the offense, then we are not permitted to further use 
those documents to determine whether the defendant in fact committed an of-
fense falling within the federal definition.”). 
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which showed that Mathis had intruded into houses, not cars, 
boats, or planes—and thus they upheld Mathis’ mandatory 
minimum sentence.44 
The Mathis majority ultimately held that the lower federal 
courts should not have used the modified categorical approach 
because, under Iowa case law, the place of a burglary is not an 
essential element but merely a means of committing an ele-
ment.45 For the moment, however, the critical point is simply 
that none of this would matter if the Court were simply to abol-
ish the modified categorical approach. The Court could simply 
adopt the following rule, foreshadowed above: in any given case 
where it is not possible to determine which portion of a statute 
gave rise to a conviction, the conviction may not be used to sup-
port an enhanced sentence or a negative immigration conse-
quence. In other words, under my proposed rule, where a court 
cannot apply the categorical approach without first accessing 
the modified categorical approach, the case is at an end. The 
government loses. 
How can I say so casually that the government should lose 
such a case? In the vast majority of these sentencing enhance-
ment and immigration cases, the prior conviction factually 
qualifies under the relevant standard. Yet to view these results 
as a windfall is to lose perspective entirely. Every prior convic-
tion has already been punished—an undeniable fact that is ef-
fectively obscured by the wholesale judicial acceptance of the 
anti-recidivist agenda. I understand that for reasons of histori-
cal accident and administrative pragmatism, the Court has 
long held that it does not violate double jeopardy for govern-
ment to enhance criminal sentences based on the fact of a prior 
conviction.46 A fortiori, it is not unconstitutional for the United 
States to deport someone for a prior conviction, even though the 
person has already been punished for it. I will not here attempt 
to mount a full case for the unconstitutionality of using prior 
 
 44. Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1073. 
 45. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). 
 46. Witte v. United States 515 U.S. 389, 400 (1995) (“In repeatedly up-
holding such recidivism statutes, we have rejected double jeopardy challenges 
because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense ‘is not to be 
viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes,’ 
but instead as ‘a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to 
be an aggravated offense because a repetitive one.’” (citing Gryger v. Burke, 
334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967); 
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 677 
(1895). 
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convictions to support secondary punishments,47 but I will 
strongly assert that this practice awards a windfall to the gov-
ernment. How does one explain to the average American that, 
after he has served his full punishment for a conviction, he can 
be given two times, or three times, or even ten times the nor-
mal sentence for some future crime based on the same convic-
tion? How does one explain that this is not “double punish-
ment” and therefore does not constitute double jeopardy? 
Suppose a person committed a burglary and was given a 
suspended sentence, serving no prison time. Further suppose 
that, within the period of probation, he commits another bur-
glary. No one has a problem with him being made to serve a 
full sentence under those circumstances. Now suppose he com-
mits a petty theft after the probationary period for the burglary 
has lapsed. May he be made to serve the original sentence for 
the burglary? Clearly not; that would be double jeopardy. Then 
why may he be given a long sentence for the petty theft—
perhaps even more severe than the sentence for the original 
burglary—on the ground that he had a prior conviction for bur-
glary? It will not do simply to say that he is not being punished 
for the burglary, but rather for being a “repeat offender,” when 
(in this case) his repeat offender status stems solely from the 
burglary. From a logical standpoint, this is bootstrapping of the 
worst kind. This is every bit as difficult for the layperson to un-
derstand as it is for a layperson to understand that not all 
“burglaries” are “burglary,” or to say that the burglary of a 
house cannot be legally treated as the burglary of a house if it 
was achieved under a statute that also covers the burglaries of 
cars and boats. 
This, finally, brings us back to what appears to be the real 
reason that the categorical approach seems to be losing favor 
on the Court. Some of the Justices (Alito and Kennedy, at least) 
think that it gives defendants and immigrants a windfall.48 But 
this is mistaken. If one insists on using the language of moral 
desert here, the categorical approach deprives the government 
 
 47. Such an argument may be grounded in the fact that the distinction 
between increased sentences as mere “enhancements” rather than “additional 
punishments” “ceases to make sense as the length of recidivism enhancements 
increases to the point where the triggering conduct cannot support the severi-
ty of the sentence.” Nathan H. Seltzer, When the Tail Wags the Dog: The Colli-
sion Course Between Recidivism Statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 83 
B.U. L. REV. 921, 935 (2003). 
 48. See Descamps v. United States 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2295–2303 (Alito, J., 
dissenting); supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
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of its windfall. The government’s windfall under current law is 
being allowed to impose multiple punishments for the same 
crime. 
The precedents, of course, say otherwise. Courts have con-
sistently rejected constitutional challenges to sentencing en-
hancements based on prior convictions.49 More specifically, they 
have rejected constitutional challenges to mandatory mini-
mums based on prior convictions.50 This would seem to follow 
logically from the Supreme Court’s holding that it does not vio-
late the Double Jeopardy Clause for a legislature to impose 
multiple punishments for a single crime.51 The only way that 
the Court could get to these conclusions was for it essentially to 
treat the Double Jeopardy Clause as only prohibiting multiple 
prosecutions for the same crime, and not multiple punishments. 
And that is, in reality, what the Court has done. 
Carissa Byrne Hessick and F. Andrew Hessick have made 
a compelling argument that, correctly interpreted, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause prohibits sentencing enhancements based on 
prior convictions.52 “[T]he right against double jeopardy ought 
to limit the government’s ability to increase punishments for 
recidivists,” they assert.53 “At the core of the prohibition on 
double jeopardy is a limitation on the government’s ability to 
impose repeated punishment against one individual for a single 
offense.”54 They demonstrate that the rhetoric of Supreme 
Court decisions has supported the notion that double jeopardy 
includes multiple punishments, not just multiple prosecu-
 
 49. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 
U.S. 20, 26 (1992) (“[W]e have repeatedly upheld recidivism statutes ‘against 
contentions that they violate constitutional strictures dealing with double 
jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process, equal 
protection, and privileges and immunities.’” (citations omitted)); North Caroli-
na v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969) (holding that double jeopardy principles 
do not pose a barrier to imposing a greater sentence on reconviction). 
 50. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 
2000), cert denied, 531 U.S. 1000 (2000) (“[E]very circuit to consider the issue 
has held that [ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence] is neither dispropor-
tionate . . . nor cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 51. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981). 
 52. Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Double Jeopardy as a 
Limit On Punishment, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (2011). 
 53. Id. at 46. 
 54. Id. at 47. A previous commentator noted, “Tension undoubtedly exists 
between recidivist statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Seltzer, supra 
note 47, at 946. 
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tions.55 They further demonstrate, however, that the Court has 
subtly but surely shifted to an understanding of double jeop-
ardy that includes only multiple prosecutions.56 This shift was 
in large part a judicial response to the perceived societal need 
for recidivist punishments in the face of increased crime. 
This is not the place for a full review of the merit in the 
Hessicks’ claim.57 All matters of constitutional interpretation 
call for a full exposition of textual, historical, and precedential 
materials. (Although, in my view, the Hessicks do demonstrate 
convincingly that history alone does not preordain a finding 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause covers only multiple prosecu-
tions.)58 I will confine my analysis to the “windfall” claim that 
Justice Alito, and perhaps Justice Kennedy, advance as against 
the categorical approach. In short, my argument is that the 
constitutionally and morally suspect status of punishment 
based on prior convictions negates the windfall argument 
against the categorical approach, and therefore that the deci-
sion of whether to abrogate or retain the approach should turn 
on pragmatic rather than moral considerations. 
If one believes, as I do, that it is at least questionable 
whether the government should be constitutionally and morally 
permitted to punish a person more than once for the same 
crime—with subsequent punishment often much more severe 
than the original one59—then the government has no moral 
 
 55. Justices Scalia and Thomas have called for the Court to openly reject 
the idea that the clause covers multiple punishments based on the textualist 
claim that “jeopardy” denotes only the harm of having to defend serial prose-
cution rather than the harm of serial penal coercion. See Dep’t of Revenue of 
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 804–05 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 56. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 52, at 49 (noting a “modern shift in in-
terpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause as primarily a prohibition on multiple 
prosecutions rather than also as a robust prohibition on multiple punish-
ments”). 
 57. Some eminent scholars have disagreed with the proposition that dou-
ble jeopardy covers multiple punishments. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, An 
Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827. 
 58. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 52, at 49. 
 59. Michael R. Schechter, Note, Sentencing Enhancements Under the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: Punishment Without Proof, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 653, 654 (1992) (“For instance, a sentencing guideline might 
force a judge to increase a defendant’s sentence from five years to ten years 
once the prosecution showed that the defendant used an uzi instead of a 
switchblade during an assault.”). Of course, in the case of immigration cases, 
the results can be devastating. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 
(1922) (deportation “may result . . . in loss of both property and life, or of all 
that makes life worth living”); see also Erica Steinmiller-Perdomo, Note, Con-
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standing to claim that the categorical approach results in a 
windfall to criminal defendants and immigrants.60 It is true 
that someone in the position of Mathis benefits from the cate-
gorical approach’s focus on the acts of hypothetical actors ra-
ther than on his own acts. Mathis ultimately escaped a severe 
mandatory minimum sentence because the Iowa burglary stat-
ute can be used to prosecute people who break into cars and 
boats, even though Mathis himself unquestionably broke into 
fixed structures. But this is only an undeserved moral windfall 
if one accepts the underlying moral premise that Mathis, who 
was already punished for his burglaries, should be punished 
again, and much more severely. If the community’s moral com-
pass suggests that people should be punished on the basis of 
their own acts and not those of hypothetical actors, then I 
would strenuously argue that it also holds that people should 
not be punished twice for the same crime. The metaphor of so-
cial contract is often invoked, in literature and political dia-
logue, to recognize that a person who has “paid his debt to soci-
ety” by serving out his punishment should be treated like 
anyone else. The notion of punishing for prior convictions is 
akin to saying that a debtor can be made to pay the same debt 
over and over again. 
To be sure, moral analysis resists precise calibration. But it 
is critical to see that this moral claim against recidivist pun-
ishment is, in this situation, a moral counterclaim. The claim 
that criminal defendants and immigrants often receive a “wind-
fall” from categorical analysis is a moral claim. It is certainly 
not based on positive law—quite the contrary, since categorical 
analysis is the law. It can perhaps be recast as some kind of 
specious claim about “legislative intent,” as in, “surely Con-
gress cannot have wanted defendants and immigrants with 
prior convictions to escape sentencing enhancements and re-
moval based on what hypothetical actors might have done.” But 
this will not do, as it can just as easily be argued that “surely 
Congress cannot have wanted people to be punished multiple 
 
sequences Too Harsh for Noncitizens Convicted of Aggravated Felonies?, 41 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1173, 1187–88 (detailing the harsh consequences for immi-
grants who have been convicted of an aggravated felony). 
 60. In terms of whether negative immigration consequences constitute 
“punishment,” I follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 
341 U.S. 223, 243 (1951) (“Deportation proceedings technically are not crimi-
nal; but practically they are for they extend the criminal process of sentencing 
to include on the same convictions an additional punishment of deportation.”). 
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times for the same crime even when it is not clear that their 
prior convictions qualify under the relevant statutes.” 
This brings us to my ultimate argument. The MCA allows 
multiple punishment even when it is not clear that their prior 
convictions qualify. If the “divisibility” test of Descamps and 
Mathis does not succeed in clearing matters up, then the MCA 
will be used in some cases where the statutes are indivisible, 
which is illegal. If one does not believe that the test of divisibil-
ity can be administered successfully, then the proper remedy is 
to abrogate the MCA, not the categorical approach. The cate-
gorical approach is easy to apply, and it does not lead to a net 
moral windfall for anyone. The MCA, on the other hand, leads 
to some cases where people are being illegally punished for the 
same crime twice because courts are confused about whether 
statutes are divisible or indivisible. Time will tell whether the 
divisibility jurisprudence of Descamps and Mathis is working, 
as a practical matter. If it works, then the status quo should 
stand. If it does not, then the MCA should be overruled. The re-
sult—that fewer people will be punished twice for the same 
crime—is something American society can live with. 
